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The distinctiveness of employment relations within multinationals: political games 
and social compromises within multinationals’ subsidiaries in Germany and 
Belgium  
 
Abstract 
This work makes a theoretical contribution to our understanding of the strategic 
mechanisms that enable subsidiary management and union agency to exploit ambiguities 
in the subnational competitive context impacting labour flexibility-security concerns. In 
so doing, the article contributes to the distinctiveness of employment relations through 
scrutiny of the internal regime competition that fosters political games in MNCs. 
Studying the dynamics, we identify the set of structuring conditions governing political 
games, and explain why some workplace regimes generate social compromises whilst 
others do not. We reveal a set of strategic conditions (i.e. technology, embeddedness and 
MNC control) upon which compromise is built in six German and Belgian subsidiaries 
of four MNCs. Our analysis suggests that subsidiary control modes through expatriates 
and local embeddedness act as key mechanisms through which the effects of wider 
strategic drivers influence the form of social compromise.  
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The distinctiveness of employment relations within multinationals: political games 
and social compromises within multinationals’ subsidiaries in Germany and 
Belgium  
 
Political games are particularly acute and apparent in multinationals (MNCs) because of 
the necessity to gain support for employment policies in different contexts (Dӧrrenbӓcher 
and Geppert, 2011). In particular, power capabilities and the interests of multinational 
actors are crucial in explaining how politics and power develop within workplaces of 
MNCs, thereby influencing practices firms adopt to organise work and regulate 
employment across different organisational and regulatory settings (Ferner et al., 2013; 
Edwards et al.; 2013). Moreover, these workplaces are embedded in both trans- and (sub)-
national labour markets, industrial relations and production networks, where relationships 
with both (local and/or national) public (i.e. government) and private (i.e. business) 
partners (Lévesque et al., 2015) contribute to creating the terrain where policy conflicts 
and compromises pervade across organisational boundaries (Edwards and Bélanger, 
2009; Almond, 2016; Almond et al., 2015). But as recent studies on emerging economies 
of India, China and Eastern Europe illustrate they also influence the MNC’s ability to 
impact upon industrial relations and HRM within the host environments (Bartram et al., 
2015). 
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Scholars in comparative employment relations have sought to explain variation in the 
policies and practices MNCs adopt. In particular, theorists from a comparative political 
economy literature have provided insights that question the primacy of national level 
institutions and point to the role that issues on strategy, sector and market structure play 
in shaping the relationship between employers and employees (Heery and Adler, 2004; 
Batt et al., 2009; Edwards et al. , 2012). This argument is broadly consistent with more 
political or power-based approaches to institutional analysis adopted by comparative 
industrial relations studies (Doellgast, 2010). Crucially, to advance knowledge on how 
and why political games occur within MNCs we need comparative research that can 
capture these processes and conditions by examining the relationships between and 
among central and local management, workers and unions when accommodating 
employment issues in MNCs (Ferner et al., 2012).  
In this paper we tackle the complexities of this dynamic by asking how social 
compromises are reached through political games in MNCs and whether and why 
industrial relations institutions influence these games. In addressing these questions, the 
paper identifies the power resources embedded in the broader strategic sub-national 
context of the firm, and it examines how these are mobilised by subsidiary management 
and labour to influence the nature of flexibility-security social compromises that emerge. 
Therefore, this paper addresses the knowledge gap in our understanding of the 
antecedents of political games and the casual mechanisms at play. In particular, a key 
  
5 
 
theoretical insight from this work is the identification and explanation of the strategic 
mechanisms that are leveraged through subsidiary management and union agency to 
exploit ambiguities in the sub-national context and to legitimise flexibility-security 
outcomes. In so doing, firstly the paper adds to the theoretical base a set of strategic 
conditions for explaining the sub-national variation in employment systems, thereby 
enhancing knowledge about why some workplace (employment) regimes generate social 
compromise when others do not. Secondly, it explores the causal mechanisms and 
processes generating these social compromises while examining the subsidiary-
subsidiary and subsidiary-headquarters (HQ) relationships, in different institutional 
settings, enhancing or inhibiting them. Particularly, by using a systematic comparative 
case study design, based on six subsidiaries of three MNCs in Germany and Belgium, we 
demonstrate that in spite of the cross-national diversity of institutional constraints local 
management and union agency in subsidiaries of the same multinational within both 
countries experience similar criticalities regarding how (1) to exploit the ambiguities 
related to the strategic sub-national context they operate in, and (2) to legitimise social 
compromises. We deploy the theory of control and developmental concerns (Edwards et 
al., 2006; Bélanger and Edwards, 2007) as a framing device to draw out a comparative 
and empirical causal account of the processes and conditions underpinning compromises 
around the negotiation of employment practices within and across MNCs’ subsidiaries. 
Within this theoretical framework, we focus on flexibility-security compromises as an 
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indication of employment relationships in MNCs. The flexibility-security nexus is a key 
analytical point within ‘pluralist’ industrial relations and sociological ‘labour process’ 
theoretical accounts shedding light on the distinctive sources of both conflict and consent 
or co-operation within the employment relationship (Burawoy and Wright, 1990). We 
begin by framing the dependent variable. Then, we theoretically develop two research 
propositions to capture key relationships explaining the compromises and understanding 
the factors shaping them. We turn to the methodology, present the findings, discuss and 
conclude.  
 
Defining social compromise in MNCs    
Conflict and co-operation are considered key features explaining the dynamics inherent 
in the employment relationship (Edwards et al., 2006). For example, employers cannot 
rely solely on the subjugation or control inherent in the employment relationship on the 
one hand, and employees have an abiding interest in cooperating to ensure the viability 
and success of the firm, and thereby their employment, on the other hand. Contingent 
pressures may act on these parties to induce high levels of co-operation but tensions may 
remain beneath the surface and emerge during moments of crisis or change (Butler and 
Tregaskis, 2015). It suggests that actors’ behaviour is not only influenced by their 
respective predetermined interests but it is also structured through the evolution of the 
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employment relationship, which depends on its strategic setting of interrelated sub-
national and national power resources. In particular, the local embeddedness indicates 
how a specific (national) institutional setting is translated in a local (or sub-national) one 
as the result of the use of available (power) resources. In turn, the strategic setting creates 
power resources available to different interest groups, which can be mobilised to create 
shared goals reflected in the employment relationship (Bélanger and Edwards, 2007).  
One substantive area of compromise between management and labour in MNCs’ 
subsidiaries relates to flexibility and security. These are confrontational areas of 
employment practice driven by competing demands from the market economy and 
business interests for efficiencies and profits on the one hand, against the social interests 
of assuring employees have access to quality jobs and fair wages, on the other (Crouch, 
2012). The sort of social compromise on flexibility/security in an MNC environment is 
complex due to the variety of power resources at play (Pulignano et al., 2016). For 
example, subsidiary-subsidiary, and subsidiary-headquarters relations represent two 
distinct axes of power relations, which create a context of ‘internal regime competition’, 
fostering political games distinctive of MNCs (Edwards et al., 2006). Because of the 
internal regime competition which is nurtured by HQ, managers and unions operating at 
the subsidiary level may be more sensitive to the negotiation of innovative arrangements 
and compromises (Bélanger et al., 1999; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005), albeit on the basis 
of distinct rationales. In other words, the sort of compromise reached may be different 
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depending on HQ control or subsidiaries’ relative discretion. As such, the way in which 
the co-existence of cooperation and conflict is dealt with through employment 
relationships could give rise to compromises in subsidiaries that have the power to 
achieve shared goals (i.e. benefits between local management and labour) and those that 
do not (Bélanger and Edwards, 2007:716). In the context of the employment compromise, 
an outcome which achieves shared goals could be described as a positive-sum flexibility-
security compromise. Where no shared benefit can be achieved for either local 
management or labour, and instead one party gains at the expense of the other, the result 
could be described as a negative-sum compromise.   
We propose that the positive-sum and negative-sum compromises are influenced by the 
power-capabilities subsidiaries’ actors (i.e. management and labour) can use as agents to 
strengthen the subsidiary’s competitive position vis-à-vis the peer subsidiaries when 
compromising on flexibility and security. These power-capabilities thereby enable 
subsidiary managers to better negotiate their relationship with HQ, and subsidiary labour 
to better negotiate with local management. A key source of power-capabilities is the 
strategic sub-national context where the subsidiary-subsidiary and the subsidiary-
headquarters relationships are set, and where the local power resources exist depending 
on the subsidiary’s degree of local embeddedness. Which are these power-capabilities 
and how they condition social compromise is discussed further below.  
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Understanding the conditions of compromise in MNCs  
Much work has conceptualised subsidiaries as active strategists within the wider MNC 
(Bélanger et al., 1999; Kristiansen and Zeitlin, 2005). These studies have emphasised the 
power-capabilities subsidiaries can use in their relationship with HQ. These capabilities 
provide to subsidiary actors resources to engage in particular types of collaborative or 
consensual action (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). Specifically, strategic resources 
comprising those both within (i.e. organisational) and outside (i.e. national institutional 
context) the subsidiary’s local environment are important for subsidiary actors to gain 
power in the relationship with the HQ, while competing with peer subsidiaries (Bouquet 
and Birkinshaw, 2008). However, power-based approaches to institutional analysis 
adopted by industrial relations scholars in their comparative studies illustrate how 
although distinct features of national regulatory settings contribute to explaining change 
in employment relationships, they do not determine these changes. Decline in union 
density and bargaining coverage as well as changes in capital markets which have 
increased the ‘shareholder’ orientation of the firm, processes of fragmentation through 
the global value chain and liberalisation and increasingly varied employer strategies have 
weakened the causal relationship between national institutions and employment 
outcomes.  
We consider institutions as dynamic and we explain how they translate into concrete 
policies and practices within different local contexts. This means to recognise the 
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importance of local embeddedness and to study the conditions and processes which 
convey how workers and management, and management themselves, come to 
compromise within these contexts.       
 
Strategic power-resources as mechanisms of compromise 
Strategic power resources are anchored in the relative control that management and labour 
have over deployment of investment and human capital in firms. Co-operation or conflict 
prevails based on how ‘concerns’ (Edwards et al., 2006:126) for resources are used in the 
short and longer term. The nature of technology, embeddedness of firms in local resource 
networks, which include institutional and regulatory settings, and the control structures 
used in the MNC provide opportunities for management and labour to access resources 
to trade in negotiations.    
Technology: refers here to the physical aspects of production (Barley, 1988). Strategic 
control over workers will vary around the technology in use. Some simple technologies 
parcel work into individual and standardised tasks, which do not require specific skills 
and expertise, thereby they entail little worker autonomy and little time for interaction 
among workers. Moreover, simple technologies and formalised rules and procedures 
reduce face-to-face contact between workers (unions) and management. It also constrains 
managerial discretion that can be used unevenly to reduce workers’ autonomy (Kalleberg 
et al., 1996). The autonomy-constraining and autonomy-enhancing effects of technology 
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are contingent upon the relative power of the workers to influence the choices and 
implementation of these choices in the labour process (Vallas, 1993). Wright (1997) 
argues that skills and expertise enhance the workers’ power in the labour market and 
labour process because of skilled workers’ scarcity and difficulties by management in 
monitoring them. In situations of high workers’ experience and skills, power lies with 
labour, opening up opportunity for discretion-enhancing effects for both labour and 
management, thereby increasing the scope for compromises, and enabling the subsidiary 
to negotiate its relationship with the HQ while retaining a competitive position vis-à-vis 
its peers. 
Embeddedness: The subsidiary’s integration (embeddedness) in local labour markets, 
industrial and employment relations systems, production networks, knowledge and skills 
systems also concur to structure local actors’ behaviour and autonomy towards the HQ 
(Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). It offers to local actors the capacity to “purchase over the 
power of process” (Ferner et al., 2012:173). Embedded actors are found where production 
networks with local (business) partners (e.g. suppliers and customers, schools, training 
centres) and governments are supportive, and where the scope of the subsidiary activity 
(e.g. R&D, sales, manufacturing) is important. Macro-institutional contexts also offer to 
subsidiary actors power capabilities they can use in their local context (Ferner et al., 
2006). Therefore, actors can use institutional legacies in ways that can weaken, re-
invigorate or develop new governance mechanisms for the regulation of employment. In 
  
12 
 
particular, the possession of power resources stemming from rights and benefits (e.g. co-
determination rights in Germany and unemployment benefits as part of the Ghent system 
in Belgium) derives from the host labour market and employment regulatory framework. 
However, the capacity to mobilise these power resources depends on the subsidiary’ 
actors’ capability to leverage them while collaborating with suppliers, unions, local 
governments and R&D institutions to be able to arrange positive-sum compromises. For 
example, Almond (2011) points to the significance of locally embedded flexible high-
skills ecosystems that drive innovation and provide subsidiary actors with power 
resources to negotiate with HQ. Regulatory contexts are part of these ecosystems. The 
strong institutional position of worker representatives in Germany due to participation 
rights and negotiation power enjoyed by ‘dual system’ representative systems (Turner, 
1991), combined with encompassing sectoral bargaining structures, may facilitate 
consensus-led cooperation. On the other hand, however, it is an empirical question to 
examine how weakened co-ordinated industrial relations institutions in Germany (Hassel, 
1999) impact on the support works councils used to grant to the employer in achieving 
the aims of the enterprise, and therefore on the local actors’ capacity to achieve 
consensus-led compromise. This is because local negotiations on employment issues 
within distinctive work settings may become more difficult within less encompassing 
sectoral bargaining structures. By the same token, and conversely, high trade union 
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density combined with a real threat of strike, such as in Belgium1, may lead management 
to not defect from mutual obligations. Because in this example the balance of power at 
the workplace level skews towards the labour side, hence leading management to arrange 
compromises which are conflict- rather than consensus-led. 
Hence, locally embedded subsidiary actors are more likely to benefit from the propensity 
to shape, and thereby accommodate, their relationships with peers and the HQ, around 
employment depending on the capacity to use different power resources. As 
abovementioned this capacity is inscribed in the degree of actors’ embeddedness within 
their local (inclusive national) contexts. However, when production routines are identical 
across countries, which implies that products are standardised, and product markets are 
unpredictable and instable, (subsidiary) managers (and workforce) can more readily 
compare across countries. In such situation, the capacity of actors (particularly labour) to 
exercise national institutional rights and benefits for positive-sum compromise may be 
more difficult as subsidiary capacity for discretion is more limited (negative-sum 
compromise). Under such conditions, locally embeddedness is more difficult, as local 
actors miss the discretion required to think strategically about the subsidiary’s future. The 
standardisation across subsidiaries can create internal competition tailored to create 
conflict rather than cooperation across subsidiaries to win mandates and secure 
                                                     
1 In 2009-2015, Belgium featured 89 (versus 19 in Germany) days not worked because of industrial action 
(https://www.etui.org/Topics/Trade-union-renewal-and-mobilisation/Strikes-in-Europe-version-3-July-
2016). 
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investment; and subsidiary managers are not in a position to offer high levels of workforce 
security. Conversely, in stable and predictable product markets, with differentiated 
products, produced in sophisticated production processes, by locally embedded 
subsidiary’s actors, management can afford to offer a higher degree of security, and 
improved working conditions (Amable and Gatti, 2004), as the basis of cooperative 
(positive-sum) employment relations.  
MNC control structures: When examining the power relationships between subsidiary 
and HQ, the preferences for control are illustrated as a function of the country-of-origin. 
HQs may seek to control a subsidiary more directly by setting policies; or more indirectly 
by monitoring outcomes. Moreover, they may achieve control by bureaucratic means, 
such as impersonal policies, rules, procedures, and programs or it may rely on social 
interactions among people, for example, by placing HQ personnel in key positions in 
subsidiaries (Harzing, 1999). Case study evidence (Almond and Ferner, 2006) illustrates 
that distinctions in control settings in MNCs often echo diversity in the country of origin 
of the MNC and the character of global policy. Accordingly, US MNCs mostly rely on 
formal, codified, and standardised global policies and monitoring systems in contrast to 
greater use of direct personal control through expatriate managers, which is typical of 
non-US MNCs, e.g. Japanese and French MNCs where personal control through 
expatriate managers, socialised in the implicit cognitive framework of the parent 
company, occurs (Chung et al. 2006; McDonnell et al., 2012). As Ferner et al. (2013) 
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argue, control may be accompanied by high formal levels of subsidiary discretion, since 
HQ control is in effect internalised within the subsidiary. This may be the case because 
by translating HQ policy to the subsidiary, expatriates become the bridge between HQ 
and subsidiary. Thereby, subsidiaries with higher discretion as the result of having an 
expatriate in loco may be in a better position to compromise on the terms of entry of a 
specific employment practice. Given the arguments above we would suggest: 
Proposition 1: structuring antecedents that enable a positive-sum (or negative–sum) 
flexibility-security compromises to emerge are technology, embeddedness and MNC 
control structures that enable (or constrain) subsidiary managers’ autonomy from HQ and 
local labour autonomy from local management. 
Proposition 2: consensual (or conflictual) institutional features structure antecedents that 
enable positive-sum (or negative-sum) flexibility-security compromises to emerge in 
subsidiaries characterised by high (low) local discretion.  
 
Methodology and research design   
This paper uses comparative case studies of six subsidiaries of three MNCs, each with a 
subsidiary located in Belgium and in Germany, and each with a focus on local bargaining 
on flexibility and security. Preliminary desk research identified organisations in the 
manufacturing sector that, on face validity, provided heterogeneity in our strategic 
resources of interest: technology, local embeddedness, corporate (MNC) control 
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structure. The firms selected for and included in the analysis were chosen for theoretical 
reasons to allow us to scrutinize how the dynamics of these strategic resources may give 
rise to different outcomes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). For this reason it was important 
that the MNC: (1) had distinctive HQ control regimes and for the purposes here we 
focused on US and non-US MNCs (Ferner et al., 2013); (2) had different opportunities 
for embedding which might arise from technology structures as well as country contexts 
and local (i.e. local government, unions, suppliers) networks (Almond, 2011). However, 
we retained a degree of control over the nature of the production process by constraining 
the sector. The three firms are as follows: 
SaCo: US-MNC in the automotive and ship-building sector, market leader but exposed 
to strong international competition. It uses automated technology, and it controls its 
subsidiaries by a mix of giving financial and performance targets and sending one US-
expatriate to each subsidiary to monitor the subsidiary’s compliance with corporate 
processes and values. In Belgium, the firm counts 2,500 employees and 1,700 in 
Germany. 
AsCo: US-MNC serving the automotive component sub-sector, operating through a range 
of global brands, and using a highly-automated assembly line. AsCo controls its 
subsidiaries through setting annual financial and performance targets. The HQ uses the 
key ratios reported quarterly by subsidiaries for coercive comparisons. 1,500 employees 
work at the German site and 1,600 at the Belgian one. 
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AdCo: It is a partially state-owned French high-tech MNC with a strong R&D-base. It 
serves customers in the public sector and world-leading companies in transport. Control 
is mainly exercised by a centralised company policy, and by sending French expatriate 
managers to the subsidiaries. Its workforce is 4,300 in Germany and 600 in Belgium. 
Data collection and analysis  
Initially, MNCs and their characteristics were identified and gathered through secondary 
data sources from websites and company documents. However, the principal data 
collection instrument thereafter was semi-structured interviews with a total of 43 
informants (central and local management, national, industry and workplace unions and 
works councillors) in six workplaces in two countries (see table 1). Generally, we 
interviewed at least two local managers and two employee representatives in each 
workplace where possible. Yet, in the German AdCo plant, there was only one local HR 
manager in place who we interviewed. In order to avoid the possible bias this may have 
caused,  we have triangulated different kinds of qualitative data, such as interview data, 
field-notes from site visits and secondary data (e.g. corporate brochures, collective 
agreements). 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The empirical investigation was conducted in 2011-2012, with follow-up interviews with 
one or two key informants in 2013 (see Table 1) to track the effects of strategic and 
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institutional antecedents on outcomes, identifying their sustainability over time. 
Interviews were conducted by different researchers with a good knowledge on the 
country’s institutional system and with native or near-native language skills. Interviews 
were semi-structured, therefore, the involved researchers followed a theory-inspired 
interview protocol that was shared among the different researchers and which was 
amended several times collectively in the light of the continuous addition of new data. 
Therefore, the adaptations were discussed by the researchers in regular project meetings. 
Such meetings were also important to check inter-observer consistency and internal 
reliability of the qualitative data (Long and Johnson, 2000). Interviews lasted 90-120 
minutes, were recorded and transcribed, and provided insights into the local negotiations 
regarding flexibility and security. We covered these topics in interviews with respondents 
at different points in time to improve the validity of data.  
As indicated earlier semi-structured interviews were supplemented by observations of 
workplace production processes as well as extensive site visits (the resulting field notes 
were coded, too). Additional data sources were collective agreements at inter-sector, 
sector and company levels (in each workplace, we asked particularly for mostly 
confidential workplace- and company-level agreements), corporate publications, press 
reports, company and trade union websites. Such materials helped us to sketch a 
comprehensive picture of each workplace/company case.    
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The gathered primary and secondary data were coded with the help of NVivo to structure 
and to analyse it. The codebook was built on a theory-inspired interview protocol 
including the variables discussed in the theoretical framework of the paper. A first step 
of analysis was to scan interview transcriptions and observation notes to generate a list of 
tentative codes at the level of the subsidiary (Bryman, 2008). However, the codebook 
evolved over time when more data were collected and subsequently added to the database.  
Such adaptations were stimulated by continuous discussions among research team 
members involved in the coding process, ensuring the integration of multiple perspectives 
when working with the data. Using different data sources (i.e. mix of primary and 
secondary data) and involving the perspectives of various researchers improved validity 
and provided a comprehensive representation of the local bargaining processes. In this 
respect, it may be argued that validity in this study pertains to the accounts or conclusions 
reached by using a qualitative multi-case study comparative method in a particular 
context for a particular purpose, defined by Maxwell (2012) as a ‘realist’ approach to 
validity. We worked with hierarchical nodes to interrelate local practices of flexibility 
and security. We returned to the data regularly to evaluate the previously defined nodes 
as well as the relationship between hierarchical nodes. After all the data had been 
collected and integrated in our database, we analysed each of the cases separately to 
examine the observed flexibility- and security-combinations, which gave rise to the 
coding concept of compromise (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Specifically, we looked at the 
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way security was negotiated in each subsidiary (e.g. based on concessions in exchange 
for flexibility or consensus independent of flexibility) to analyse its effects on the 
workforce and the viability of the subsidiary. At this stage, we limited our analysis to 
technology, embeddedness and control. Since this analysis made clear that there was more 
similarity within subsidiaries of the same MNC than across subsidiaries of different 
MNCs in the same country, we pursued another analysis based on the MNC-level to have 
a clear view on similarities and differences among subsidiaries belonging to the same 
MNC. Finally, we performed a last analysis adding institutions. 
Overall, there are three major aspects in the data collection and analysis that highlight 
qualitative rigor (Gioia et al., 2013). Firstly, different techniques of data collection were 
applied to get rich data and in-depth insights. Secondly, the data were carefully analysed 
in several subsequent steps. Finally, the process of data collection, coding and analysis 
involved a team of researchers, which ensures the integration of multiple perspectives. 
 
Findings  
Technology, embeddedness and control (proposition 1)  
Within SaCo and AsCo workforces were mostly engaged in simple, repetitive tasks, 
following the formalised rules and procedures indicated by management. There was a 
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constant threat of production relocation, developed through internal benchmarking across 
subsidiaries which was facilitated by the standardisation of products. Moreover, the 
subsidiaries generally had only weak ties to their host context which further reinforced 
threats of relocation. Under the constant HQ pressure to reduce costs and improve 
productivity, local management in both MNCs’ subsidiaries focused on increasing 
flexibility and cutting costs to safeguard the continuity of the local operations. Because 
of the low market power and the relatively weak worker autonomy, labour lacked the 
capacity to influence management’s decisions in local negotiations, which complicated 
reaching compromises.   
Aside tight indirect control through setting financial and performance targets and 
benchmarking from the HQ, however, each subsidiary in SaCo could count on the 
presence of an expatriate from the headquarters in the function of general manager. This 
offered scope to control local resources, but also offered the subsidiary support through 
the expatriate manager’s translation of headquarters’ requirements to the subsidiary 
context. This point was illustrated by the Vice President of HR in SaCo who noted the 
role of expatriate managers in translating priorities and finding solutions even when firms 
are subsidiaries are operating in competition: 
 
‘We put plants into comparison all the time. I know what the cost level of this facility is 
compared to China, North America, Brazil. Having a high-level manager in the 
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subsidiary helps in the exercise of continuous inter-plant comparison but we have to 
recognise that it also helps the subsidiary to find solutions when they are needed.’ (Vice 
President HR Europe, SaCo) 
 
In the mid-2000s, SaCo’s German subsidiary got into the red when product demand 
decreased by about 50% and consequently, volumes declined. To limit the incurred 
losses, HQ demanded substantial increases in flexibility and costs cuts. Under the 
imminent threat of closure, local management and the works council engaged in 
workplace bargaining to safeguard the subsidiary. The subsidiary’s expatriate manager 
played a crucial role, hence conveying the HQ message that if the plant did not reach the 
required targets, it would be closed.  
 
‘There is a general shift of production and capacity to the East; it’s cheaper to produce 
there. China and Brazil clearly are the two main poles of SaCo now. The capacity is 
installed there, not really in Europe. So the main question is: does SaCo need facilities 
in Europe?’ (HR Manager Belgium, SaCo) 
 
The concluded agreement (compromise) contained concessions by labour to avoid 
closure: it foresaw a 20% agency work quota to cut costs and enhance short-term 
flexibility, and the abolishment of non-statutory premiums (e.g. shift premiums). 
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Furthermore, working-time accounts and a flexible working-time corridor of 28 to 42 
hours depending on production volume was implemented, with the possibly of changes 
on short notice. In exchange for the aforementioned measures, the works council 
negotiated a two-year employment guarantee for the regular workforce, and forced 
redundancies avoided. The concessions aimed at not taking too much away from local 
management and pleasing labour with a two-year employment guarantee in exchange for 
the wide-reaching changes. On the one hand, the volume drop was expected to be 
temporary, stressing the subsidiary’s long-term prospects. On the other hand, the 
negotiated measures would increase the subsidiary’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
subsidiaries and the market, which contributed to the positive economic outlook, too. 
Overall, the subsidiary could continue its operations, but working conditions became 
more flexible. 
When cost competition intensified for SaCo in Belgium, the HQ threatened to relocate 
production because of the high wage levels compared to Mexico and Brazil. To avoid 
relocation, cutting costs combined with more flexibility was demanded by the HQ. 
Shortly after local negotiations had started, unions threatened to drop out and organise a 
strike, mainly because of local management’s demand to use 20% agency work. Unions 
were confident about their claim because of their organisational strength. On the other 
hand, however, they were aware of the benefits of their strong links with the local context, 
such as collaboration with technical schools and universities to ensure the supply of 
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skilled workers. Moreover, as a Belgian trade unionist told, the Belgian plant was 
strategically located in the centre of Europe, and it could benefit from good infrastructure 
which strengthened the subsidiary’s position vis-à-vis the other subsidiaries:  
 
‘We are located in a technology park, with an airport nearby; there are also very 
competent training centres meaning that there is a supply with highly qualified workers.’ 
(Belgian unionist, SaCO) 
 
The embeddedness provided workers through the unions the opportunity to use these ties 
as an upward casual mechanism to negotiate employment conditions with the HQ. While 
the subsidiary’s product market conditions endangered its operations, the relatively high 
degree of local embeddedness decreased the likelihood of closure by recovering labour 
from the autonomy-constraining effects of technology. Local management, local unions 
and the expatriate managers alike were aware of this, and local unions wanted to use this 
awareness as a lever to block agency work. Therefore, the expatriate manager proposed 
a bundle of concessions fitting the requirements of the HQ, but also partially those of 
local actors. Agency work was banned, but a 10% increase in fixed-term work as well as 
compensated working-time extensions were agreed in exchange to deal with workload 
fluctuations. At the same time, management gave consent to the unions’ request of 
introducing employment paths, regulating that workers entering the company on fixed-
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term contracts would be upgraded to permanent ones after one to three years. This 
fulfilled the unions’ demand of increasing job security. Like in Germany, the expatriate 
facilitated the compromise, by bridging HQ with local actors’ demands of safeguarding 
operations and raising security.  
Data for the second US-MNC shows a different pattern of relationships. The high number 
of competitors placed AsCo’s subsidiaries in a weak position. As market entry barriers 
were very low, economic pressure increased due to competition from East Asia offering 
products at comparably low prices. Furthermore, a European HR manager stated that 
using simple automatised technology for manufacturing standardised products facilitated 
benchmarking, leading to continuous threats of plant closure and production relocation.  
 
‘We already have competitors from China and the Far East that come to Europe. We do 
not yet know whether our European plants will continue assembly in the future. In ten 
years the situation will be completely different. As long as we are cost-competitive, the 
production will stay here. But the assembly in the Western countries will surely decrease. 
This may affect the number of our European subsidiaries.’ (European HR Manager, 
AsCo) 
 
Due to these conditions, AsCo’s market power was limited, which had implications for 
local bargaining, as the resources to be divided were scarce and labour was able to 
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leverage power vis-à-vis capital. Moreover, subsidiaries were barely embedded, so there 
were no links with the local environment that would have increased stability and at least 
partially prevented relocation threats. The HQ controlled its subsidiaries by setting short-
term performance targets – autonomy was given to subsidiary for implementation of 
targets, but as the Vice President HR Europe argues there was no opportunity for 
renegotiation of targets nor their translation through, for instance, expatriate managers:  
 
‘Local managers they have to follow the corporate procedures. There is an annual budget 
process that means for the next year you have to agree with HQ what will you spend, 
what will be your revenue. Once agreed to the numbers, you have a lot of freedom to 
execute.’ (Vice President HR Europe, AsCo)  
 
Just-in-time production meant that the requested flexibility often came without security 
in return, with customers dictating flexible production and order quantities. The German 
subsidiary’s clients could change volumes every week, causing problems in organising 
work internally. Management thus demanded using a 15% agency work quota (extendable 
to up to 40% during the holiday season) to react to fluctuations in volume changes. The 
works council found few legitimate grounds for challenge because the viability of the 
plant depended on customer revenues, and to create such revenues, high levels of 
flexibility were required. Moreover, to increase cost competitiveness, there was an unpaid 
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working time extension of 2.5 hours per week and Saturday was treated as a normal 
working day without premiums. Although the works council generally wanted to avoid 
such practices, the internal competition used by HQ meant the subsidiary was in a weak 
competitive position relative to its counterparts in Poland and Mexico. A German work 
councillor reported that high flexibility and low costs where the key metrics impacting 
the subsidiary’s success for internal bids and in the absence of expatriate managers, local 
management was left with few alternatives:  
 
‘To generate a profit of € 5 million, the sales volume must be at least € 250 million. The 
Polish plant might only need € 100 million to generate the same profit. The unpaid 30 
minutes per day help us to increase our competitiveness.’ (German works councillor, 
AsCo)  
 
AsCo’s Belgian subsidiary struggled with similar pressures. Constant relocation threats 
from the HQ based on benchmarking, and customer demands in terms of costs and 
flexibility had to be accommodated to safeguard the plant at least in the short-run. The 
main way to deal with customer pressure was using 10% fixed-term and 5% agency work. 
Furthermore, the plant’s adaptability was improved by strengthening functional 
flexibility, as workers were required to be able to work at three different workstations or 
more. Using the threat of strike by unions to resist management demands was not realistic 
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as costly work interruptions would have disturbed customer relations, downgraded the 
plant’s position vis-à-vis peer subsidiaries, and severely endangering the continuation of 
operations. This bundle of measures was negotiated between subsidiary level actors only 
working within tightly defined resource constraints. There was no bridge to HQ strategic 
decisions via expatriates and thus no opportunity for the rules to be challenged or 
renegotiated.  
Overall, flexibility levels were high in AsCo’s subsidiaries, resulting from pressure from 
the market, the customers and the HQ alike. The combination of high competition, simple 
automated technology, standardised products, a disconnect from the local context, tight 
indirect control via benchmarking and the lack of a relational bridge to HQ constrained 
subsidiary managers’ autonomy from HQ and labour autonomy from local management; 
thereby stifling compromise on how to combine flexibility and security (negative-sum 
flexibility-security compromise).  
The structural conditions were very different for the French AdCo. Low competitive 
pressures due to a limited number of competitors and strong market entry barriers, 
combined with the long-term character of orders, fulfilled by experienced and skilled 
workforces, created the terrain where unions and management could engage in 
compromising on flexibility and security. This was facilitated by benchmarking being 
merely possible because of the differentiated and mostly custom-built nature of the 
product, and by the close HQ-subsidiaries links, which were realised by relatively 
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centralised company policies, and the delegation of expatriates to all subsidiaries. French 
expatriates filled middle and high local management positions, which enhanced 
coordinating strategies between the two levels and translating HQ requests to the 
subsidiary context. AdCo mainly attracted public orders, which implicitly protected the 
subsidiaries, because public bodies requested spending taxpayers’ money in the same 
country to stabilise local employment. Furthermore, due to the skilled workforce, 
corporate subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany developed strong ties with technical 
schools and universities to ensure the skills supply. Hence, subsidiaries’ degree of local 
embeddedness was high, and closing down a subsidiary in Belgium or/and Germany was 
unlikely, as it would have meant the loss of an entire market due to the requirement of 
local production. This favourable strategic context underlines the company’s subsidiaries’ 
high market power, which facilitated local bargaining on flexibility-security, as 
comparably more resources were to be divided in AdCo – as a European Works 
Councillor reported - than in the case of SaCo and AsCo.   
 
‘The advantage of such a high degree of centralisation is that the plants will never get 
into financial trouble. If small companies lose a customer or are not paid in time, they 
will immediately come into difficulties with the banks and so on. This will never happen 
to us.’ (European works councillor, AdCo) 
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The specialisation of AdCo’s subsidiaries facilitated finding local solutions meeting the 
requirements of the customer, the workforce and the HQ alike. By reflecting proximity 
between the plant and the HQ, expatriate managers at different hierarchical levels 
cooperated with local management and labour to implement the centralised corporate 
policy as here recalled by the European Vice President HR in AdCo.  
 
‘It’s obvious then since we are part of a large group, central policies are in some way 
applied. So, the autonomy we have at the subsidiary level is an autonomy inside the 
group.’ (European Vice President HR, AdCo) 
 
Local actors in the German subsidiary could translate the high levels of stability in a set 
of practices combining flexibility and security for the workforce. Because of the high 
skilled workforce, including engineers and technicians specialised in high-tech 
sophisticated products, the expatriates’ and local management’s major concern was skill 
retention, and good working conditions as the main demand of the unions and the works 
councils. These shared objectives facilitated local bargaining and reaching compromise. 
Annual professional development plans for every employee were concluded to improve 
employability and build up long-term training- and career-related patterns within the 
organisation, and to increase functional flexibility in the long-run. Voluntary mobility 
schemes were implemented across subsidiaries for intercultural and professional training 
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purposes. Works council and management agreed on introducing lifelong working-time 
accounts to accommodate workload peaks, with credited hours used for instance for 
sabbaticals or early retirement. The works council also demanded a wage scheme 
extending the amounts set at sector level, and management accommodated this request in 
the light of the need to retain the skilled workforce. Thus, above-tariff wages were used 
as recruitment tool and extra financial incentive, hence potentially increasing workforce 
loyalty. Expatriates supported local negotiations. As they knew which kind of policies the 
HQ requested for its subsidiaries, they could translate these requests to the subsidiary 
context, guaranteeing the fit with corporate policies, which strongly emphasised training 
issues.  
The situation in the Belgian subsidiary was similar. Local unions strived for practices 
emphasising security, which could easily be brought in line with the company policy of 
skill retention. For instance, structured career- and development plans were implemented 
to ensure continuous personnel development as requested by the unions. Moreover, a 
voluntary inter-plant mobility scheme was negotiated allowing rotations aiming at up-
skilling and retaining employees with specific technical skills. To deal with workload 
fluctuations, unions and local management agreed on long and compensated weekend 
shifts without incurring overtime. Generally, temporary work in AdCo’s German and 
Belgian subsidiaries was only sporadically used for short-term assignments e.g. sickness. 
This was because AdCo’s general company policy stressed skill-retention and long-term 
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work relationships, which was facilitated by the stability and predictability of product 
markets and the long-term dimension of (public) orders. Moreover, local embeddedness 
contributed to increase the subsidiaries’ high levels of stability. For example, training 
programs helped subsidiaries to deal with skill shortages. To ensure the supply with 
highly-skilled graduates, AdCo’s subsidiaries in Germany and Belgium collaborated with 
universities in the region by offering extensive internship programs, encouraging 
graduates to write bachelor, master or PhD theses in collaboration with the subsidiaries. 
Flexibility could be achieved by working-time measures and the staff’s functional 
flexibility, which was strengthened by continuous training efforts. On the other hand, the 
internalisation of control through expatriates at different hierarchical levels also 
contributed to local compromise, since it was targeted at implementing corporate policy 
locally.  
 
Institutions (proposition 2)  
Although Germany and Belgium are coordinated economies, differences in negotiation 
patterns exist which – as the VP HR in SaCo reports depend very much on the differences 
in the industrial relations settings and social climate. 
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‘Lutte, avancer is used in Belgium, it’s really fighting which can make collaboration 
difficult. In Germany it’s not us and they, but us together, that is a major difference.’ (VP 
HR, SaCo) 
 
The rhetoric of conflict is particularly manifest in the Belgian subsidiaries of SaCo and 
AsCo. In SaCo, local unions threatened management with industrial action to make clear 
their disagreement to use agency work. As a local HR Manager reports management 
accepted the unions’ request because they were aware that with a local membership of 
about 95% a strike would have led to costly work interruptions.  
 
‘Being in conflict is like playing Russian roulette, as you start to negotiate and nobody 
knows where it goes’ (Local HR Manager, Belgium, SaCo).  
 
Secondly, management was confident about the viability of the subsidiary because of its 
relatively high degree of local embeddedness and its strategic location in the heart of 
Europe, which was advantageous from a logistics point of view. Supported by the 
expatriate manager, local management in SaCo Belgium proposed a compromise 
including not only flexibility, but also job security in exchange. The outcome was a 
concessions-driven compromise.  
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In contrast, in AsCo Belgium, unions could hardly use any strike threats to push through 
security for the workforce. Due to comparatively low degrees of local embeddedness and 
the tight indirect control via benchmarking, the subsidiary’s product market and 
organisational features caused even higher pressure than in SaCo. Thus, despite the 
relatively high local union density, unions considered abandoning the threat of strike as 
more beneficial so to not risk displeasing the HQ by producing adverse effects related to 
the subsidiary’s position within the MNC and on the market in terms of worsening 
customer relations, which could have caused the subsidiary’s ultimate closure. The result 
is a negative-sum flexibility-security compromise. In contrast, the situation in AdCo 
Belgium was different because of the favourable strategic context (high technology, 
differentiated products, low competition, high degree of local embeddedness, direct 
control via expatriates). Both companies’ subsidiaries thus enjoyed high market power 
and stable profits, which opened scope for consensual negotiations as more resources 
could be divided between local management and labour than in the subsidiaries of SaCo 
and AsCo. Thus, in AdCo’s subsidiaries, negotiations went smoothly and without threats 
of industrial action, as flexibility could easily be complemented with security based on 
shared interests of the bargaining parties. There was not need to engage in conflict to 
achieve the shared objective of providing flexibility (working-time measures, functional 
flexibility) and security (training, job security) (positive-sum flexibility-security 
compromise).  
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In Germany, the presence of co-determination rights may lead to the assumption that 
negotiation patterns are more consensual than in Belgium. This is because local 
management and the works council share both authority and responsibility, and are a sort 
of co-managers with regard to the workplace and its viability. A works councillor in AsCo 
describes the ‘dual’ role of serving the employees and the workplace alike as being caught 
‘between two stools’. 
 
‘There will not be a single decision without the involvement of the works council. We have 
always found together good solutions for all.’ (German works councillor, SaCo) 
 
The German subsidiaries of SaCo and AsCo had to cope with pressures of production 
relocation and plant closure. The fact that both subsidiaries operated in highly competitive 
markets, manufactured standardised goods based on the use of automated technology and 
were rather indirectly controlled meant that pressure evolved from both market and HQ. 
In SaCo Germany, the pressure to increase flexibility was met with the ultimate shared 
goal of finding a way to safeguard the plant. It was the result of the collaboration between 
local management and works council, with the support of the expatriate, on a bundle of 
flexibility measures and an employment guarantee in exchange for that (concession-
driven compromise). On the other hand, a German works councillor argues that 
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management strategically used the employment guarantee to engage the works council in 
a compromise.  
 
‘I am one of the men behind this company agreement and I took part in its negotiations. 
I am responsible for both the positive and the negative aspects of the agreement. But an 
agreement is always a compromise which helps both sides.’ (German works councillor, 
SaCo) 
 
Similarly, and despite high levels of pressure from the market and the HQ, negotiation 
patterns reflected co-management between local management and the works council in 
AsCo Germany. These negotiations pointed towards implementing local practices to 
safeguarding the continuity of the operations. Although the situation was tense, a strike 
was not considered a realistic option by the unions, because it would have endangered the 
relationships with local management, the HQ and customers, and thereby worsened the 
subsidiary’s position within the MNC. Overall, unions did not engage in conflict but - as 
reported in the quote below by a German work councillor - they attempted to work jointly 
on finding solutions, sharing both authority and responsibility for the negotiated 
compromise (negative-sum flexibility and security compromise).  
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‘When difficult decisions were to be made we always sit together and discuss in an open 
way. We also always look at the alternatives: what would happen if we took this or that 
decision? When sitting together and arguing about the right way, we ask ourselves. How 
can the works council support the company? Everybody needs to have an ear for the 
concerns of the others.’ (German works councillor, AsCo) 
 
Consensual patterns of negotiation were also observed in AdCo’s German subsidiaries, 
in which high levels of stability and security prevailed as the result of a favourable 
strategic context. This created the terrain for good relations between local management 
and works councils, and entailed consensual negotiations about the division of resources. 
In AdCo Germany, there has not been a strike for years. One reason, as emphasised by a 
works councillor, being ‘management involves the works council in all upcoming 
changes or processes, so generally the collaboration is trustworthy’, which is confirmed 
by management (positive-sum flexibility-security compromise): ’We work together 
trustworthy. Works councils hardly reject any of the management’s plans. We also do not 
fight for compromises’.  
 
Discussion and conclusion   
The findings (see Table 2) shed light on how the different types of strategic antecedents 
of flexibility-security compromises interact leading to both anticipated and unanticipated 
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outcomes. Findings support the theoretically derived propositions, but extend these by 
shedding light on the interplay between these three strategic components – technology, 
local embeddedness and MNC control structures – and the potential learning that may 
arise. Thus a key theoretical insight from this work is the identification and explanation 
of the strategic mechanisms that are leveraged through subsidiary management and union 
agency to exploit ambiguities in the sub-national context and to legitimise flexibility-
security outcomes. The evidence shows convergence across an MNC’s subsidiaries in 
response to flexibility-security concerns, and the convergence that arises does not always 
reflect managerial gains at the cost of labour losses. Further, the within-MNC 
convergence is not reflected across the MNCs. In other words, the dynamic between firm 
resources and host institutional arrangements can generate new or innovative outcomes 
that transcend a dominant strategic or institutional logic alone. We suggest that it is the 
learning that takes place as part of the dynamic relationship between strategic and 
institutional conditions that is critical in explaining the results. Specifically, through the 
research design and analysis we identified and illustrate how the interplay between 
strategic and the host institutional contexts of Germany and Belgium created a common 
positive-sum gain across the subsidiaries of AdCo, despite the conflictual Belgian 
context. In contrast, common negative-sum gains were evidenced in the subsidiaries of 
AsCo despite the more consensual German institutional context. While in SaCo a new 
alternative outcome, which might be described as a hybrid outcome, emerged in its two 
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subsidiaries i.e. a concession-based flexibility-security compromise. These results 
suggest that the strategic conditions have a powerful and predictable impact on 
stakeholder power resources. But it is the learning that occurs amongst the actors through 
the interplay between the mode of control within the strategic conditions and the 
institutional context that has the greatest potential to alter the nature of the compromise 
achieved, and potentially lead to new or innovative solutions. These findings and their 
implications are discussed in detail below.   
[Table 2 about here] 
 
First, support for a positive-sum gain was evidenced as predicted. Specifically we found 
that a positive-sum flexibility-security compromise was evidenced when a) locally 
embedded networks are prevalent, the nature of the technology of production allows 
greater local autonomy as a result of the stability of the product market and low 
competition, and control is internalised within the subsidiary through expatriates. This 
allows subsidiary managers discretion from HQs, thereby enabling them the space to 
orient toward longer term resource investment. It also opens up the space for the strategic 
value of labour to be renegotiated in terms of firm sustainability and not simply costs 
(Proposition 1); and when b) the national institutional framework is strong and more 
consensual (Proposition 2). These conditions were illustrated in the case material from 
AdCo, the French MNC operating in Germany. The case evidence suggested the 
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supportive strategic structures had created sufficient resources for management to provide 
attractive training and working conditions in return for enhanced flexibility. In addition, 
the evidence suggests that historically consensual negotiations between management and 
workers had created favourable working relations that made reaching compromises easier 
and acceptable to the variety of stakeholders. However, the evidence also found that 
AdCo was also able to achieve a positive-sum flexibility-security compromise in the more 
conflictual Belgium context, thus contradicting Proposition 2. In explaining this apparent 
contradiction we found that the expatriate managers played a crucial role in translating 
HQ interests and framing these in a way that navigated the more potentially conflictual 
context. Here we suggest our work makes an important contribution to the literature as it 
demonstrates the role of the expatriate manager in the learning processes that arise during 
the dynamic between institutional and strategic influences (Bélanger et al., 1999). 
Organisational knowledge sharing and learning through mobile staffing exchanges are 
recognised as important in creating innovations in employment practices (Tregaskis et 
al., 2010; Edwards et al., 2010) but the work here demonstrates the crucial role of the 
expatriate in the practice innovations arising through political processes that incorporate 
knowledge of the external institutional environment. The evidence here would add to the 
emerging empirical work on how social exchanges created through personal control can 
act as a mechanism for interactive learning (Kristensen, 2015) and the role of subsidiary 
managers in addressing social concerns around labour use in its locality (Anonymous, 
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2017). In political games where the stakeholder interests differ it is arguable that the social 
exchanges are critical to enabling positive outcomes: something which cannot be 
achieved through centralised formal control.  
Second, the analysis showed support for the antecedents of the negative-sum gain 
outcomes proposed whereby a negative-sum flexibility-security compromise is found 
where markets are less locally embedded, unpredictable and unstable, in turn reducing 
local management and labour’s autonomy from HQ support, and where corporate control 
is not internalised within the subsidiary through expatriate managers, therefore limiting 
the autonomy of local management for HQ decision making (Proposition 1); and where 
the national institutional environment is strong but conflictual (Proposition 2). This was 
evidenced in AsCo operating in Belgium. Thus, here the tough market conditions had a 
profound effect on the resources available to local management and local workers, 
making compromises more difficult to achieve. The fact that even in the more consensual 
German institutional context positive outcomes could not be negotiated would add weight 
to the argument that strategic antecedents have a powerful structuring influence. Further, 
because the control mechanisms relied on indirect transactional monitoring rather than 
expatriate managers, then AsCo failed to create the social relational context through 
which HQ and local interests could be balanced, and were mutual goals could be 
developed and agreed (Herrigel, 2015). At the same time, arguably, the opportunity for 
learning to find alternative outcomes was absent because of the lack of a social relational 
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context. Strategic structuring antecedents would appear to be dominant in setting 
employment outcomes only where local subsidiary power resources are weak. The use of 
indirect benchmarking set the rules of the game and have been found to lead to short-term 
opportunism (Belangér et al., 1999), which can undermine the opportunity for 
subsidiaries to engage in more creative sustainable entrepreneurial activity (Kristensen 
and Zeitlin, 2005). Our findings add to understanding the dynamics of power games by 
illustrating how the absence of social exchanges limit the pathways by which employment 
compromises are reached.  
Third, the conditioning impact of the institutional context on the flexibility-security 
compromise reached was inconsistent. Specifically in the French MNC, AdCo, a positive-
sum flexibility-security compromise was reached even when the conflictual Belgium 
context might have theoretically suggested otherwise. At the same time, the compromise 
outcomes for the two US-owned MNCs’ subsidiaries were not consistent with those 
theorised. These results are important for they suggest that by examining different types 
of antecedents in tandem, in this case strategic and institutional, it provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the trade-offs taking place. The analysis here would suggest 
that whilst the institutional context is important in defining the issues which can be 
negotiated i.e. that are more amenable or acceptable to local stakeholders and thus the 
degree of conflict likely to be encountered, it is the strategic antecedents with respect to 
the nature of the technology of production that set the tone/rules for the negotiations. 
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Strategic efficiencies were demanded by all firms, but where the nature of the technology 
of production afforded local workforces skilled autonomy and management discretion in 
the use of skilled autonomy then local stakeholders had greater resources to trade and 
generate alternative choices.  
Fourth, the analysis revealed a hybrid outcome which we defined as a concession-based 
flexibility and security compromise, evidenced in SaCo. This finding is significant 
because the comparative research design has enabled us to isolate the two drivers 
underpinning the creation of this hybrid outcome, namely an engaged expatriate manager 
and locally embedded subsidiary. This US-owned MNC with subsidiaries in Germany 
and Belgium faced the same adverse economic environment with the same technological 
resources. However, the Belgian subsidiary had strong local ties, which the union was 
able to lever for negotiation with the expatriate manager. The German subsidiary was less 
locally embedded but the expatriate manager played a particularly strong role in creating 
an acceptable package for the union and HQ. Thus the same outcome was achieved in 
both subsidiaries of the MNC, but the path differed. We also found important influence 
exerted through expatriate control and local embeddedness in the French firms. 
Theoretically this finding suggests dominant influences of adverse market effects can 
potentially be offset by the use of personal control as a power resource for management 
to negotiate an alternative outcome or by local embeddedness as a worker power resource 
to help negotiate an alternative outcome. In both instances the worker and management 
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actors engaged in, or built upon, resource-building strategies to create sustainable 
employment outcomes for the subsidiary and HQ; absence of these elements may lead to 
the more predictable negative-sum flexibility-security compromise.  
The research also has some limitations. Our work focused on one sector. There may be 
sector influences that impact on the structuring antecedents available to subsidiary actors 
and the extent to which these can be leveraged. Our work also examined subsidiaries from 
two institutional environments, sharing coordinated market governance structures and in 
so doing demonstrated the heterogeneity in the causal levers used by the subsidiary actors. 
Similar to studies of MNCs in developing economies, such as China (e.g. Zhu, 2015), 
intra-institutional heterogeneity warrants further investigation and would build on the 
current limited work demonstrating heterogeneity across countries that are traditionally 
clustered together (Gooderham et al., 2014).  
In conclusion, we would suggest there are three generic contributions of this research. 
First, by examining multiple strategic and institutional structuring conditions in tandem 
we tease out the ways in which these antecedents have contributed to political games. 
Theoretically we suggest that local embeddedness and personal control through the use 
of expatriates are key factors shaping how the resources generated through market 
conditions are subsequently used to negotiate the employment outcomes across different 
institutional contexts. Second, our ability to identify the antecedents in the power games 
for employment compromises suggests that the convergence within the MNCs’ 
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subsidiaries was driven by strategic concerns, particularly influence from expatriate 
managers. The role of the expatriate afforded the subsidiary greater discretion to engage 
in negotiations supporting work by Ferner et al. (2006). But importantly this discretion 
may not lead to divergent subsidiary approaches across the MNC. Instead the empirical 
evidence indicates that within the same multinational expatriate managers can bring about 
the same employment outcomes, but use their discretion to navigate the route through 
leveraging the relevant power resources given the strategic and the institutional 
conditions. Finally, the research makes a methodological contribution to the field of 
international comparative employment studies. Data collection over a three-year period 
enabled the tracking of the effects of antecedents on outcomes and the sustainability of 
those outcomes over time. Therefore this research design enabled the casual paths 
underpinning the dynamics of political games involving multiple actors and across 
multiple contexts i.e. organisational and local institutional. In so doing it answers the calls 
for more emphasis on understanding the dynamics of change in MNCs (Edwards et al., 
2014). Our work, in particular, demonstrates the significance of the learning capability at 
the level of local management and labour actors in generating novel solutions. 
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Table 1: Overview of interviews 
 Local 
management 
Local unions Central 
management 
National/sectoral 
unions 
Belgium SaCo: 3 (one 
follow-up) 
AsCO: 2 
AdCo: 2 
SaCo: 2 
AsCO: 3 (one 
follow-up) 
AdCo: 2 (one 
follow-up) 
SaCo: 2 
AsCO: 2 
AdCo: 1 
4 
Germany SaCo: 3 (one 
follow-up) 
AsCO: 2 
AdCo: 1 
SaCo: 2 
AsCO: 6 (two 
follow-up) 
AdCo: 3 (one 
follow-up) 
3 
Total 13 18 5 7 
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Table 2: Summary of the structuring antecedents and flexibility-security compromise outcomes  
 SaCo (USA) AsCo (USA) AdCo (France) 
 DE BE DE BE DE BE 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Number of employees 1,700 2,500 1,500 1,600 4,300 600 
Union density 80% 95% 75% 95% 25% 85% 
Market 
Competition High High Low  
Nature of the product Standardised Standardised Differentiated, highly customised 
Strategic antecedents 
Technology 
Automated assembly lines 
Automated assembly lines, rigid, 
continuous production process 
High-tech adapted according to the 
customers’ requirements 
Local embeddedness Low Medium Low Low High High 
MNC control structures Hybrid, mix of in/direct control Indirect, based on benchmarking Direct, via expatriate managers 
National employment 
relations system 
consensual conflictual consensual conflictual consensual conflictual  
 
 
Outcome Concession-based 
flexibility/security compromise 
Negative-sum flexibility/security 
compromise 
Positive-sum flexibility/security 
compromise 
 
